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Abstract
We propose a model in which rms involved in trading securities overinvest in nancial expertise.
Intermediaries or traders in the model meet and bargain over a nancial asset. As in the bargaining
model in Dang (2008), counterparties endogenously decide whether to acquire information, and
improve their bargaining positions, even though the information creates adverse selection. We add
to this setting the concept of \nancial expertise" as resources invested to lower the cost of later
acquiring information about the value of the asset being traded. These investments are made before
the parties know about their role in the bargaining game, as proposer or responder, buyer or seller.
A prisoner's dilemma arises because investments to lower information acquisition costs improve
bargaining outcomes given the other party's information costs, even though the information has
no social benet. These investments lead to breakdowns in trade, or liquidity crises, in response to
random but infrequent increases in asset volatility.1 Introduction
Credit markets \froze up" in 2007-2008 following a drop in housing prices, an increase in uncertainty
about the value of asset-backed securities, and the failures or government bailouts of several major
nancial institutions. Traditional lending relations were disrupted. Businesses, municipalities,
and consumers around the world were unable to obtain credit. Economists and other informed
observers agree that the negative consequences for real economic activity were dramatic and are
likely to persist for some time.
Why were so many nancial intermediaries unwilling to trade with each other, despite the
apparent gains to trade? Financial economists explain these market failures as a consequence of
adverse selection. Firms in the nancial sector had invested vast resources transforming relatively
straight-forward securities, such as residential mortgages and credit-card debt, into complex in-
struments through securitization. They had then created trillions of dollars worth of derivative
contracts based on these asset-backed securities. To facilitate this, nancial rms hired legions of
highly trained and highly compensated experts to design, value, and hedge the complex securities
and derivatives. Unfortunately, when housing prices fell and default rates rose, the complexity
of the nancial instruments, and the opacity of the over-the-counter markets where they traded,
made it extremely dicult to identify where in the system the riskiest or most impaired liabilities
were located. Estimates for the fundamental value of these nancial instruments became highly
uncertain and volatile. Indeed, the expertise rms had developed may have worked against them
in the crises. Their relative advantage in valuing securities may have increased the asymmetric
information they faced in dealing with relatively uninformed parties, who were in a position to
supply liquidity.
The benign explanation for how the nancial system reached this point is that such liquidity
crises are an unfortunate consequence of increasing the ecient allocation of risk through more
complex derivative securities. Individuals, rms, and regulators must learn about new nancial
innovations through experimentation, before their risks, and the limitations of models and systems
that support their use, are fully understood. There may well be considerable truth to these argu-
ments. We oer an interpretation of these phenomena that is less benign, but which may also help
1us move to a more complete understanding of them.
We develop a model in which the investments by rms in nancial expertise, such as hiring
Ph.D. graduates to design and value nancial instruments of ever increasing complexity, becomes
an \arms race." By this phrase we mean two things:
 Investment in nancial expertise confers an advantage on any one player in competing for a
xed surplus that is neutralized in equilibrium by similar investment by his opponents.
 Investment in nancial expertise is dangerous, in that it creates a risk of destruction of the
surplus itself when there is an exogenous shock.
Our model shows that nancial rms involved in trading assets with uncertain value may nd
optimal to acquire socially undesirable levels of expertise and this might interfere with the ecient
functioning of nancial markets. In the model, traders (or nancial intermediaries generally) acquire
expertise in processing information about an asset. The resulting eciency in acquiring information
gives them an advantage in subsequent bargaining with competitors. Neither the information, nor
the expertise in acquiring and evaluating it, has any social value in the model. Yet intermediaries
build such expertise despite the knowledge that it may increase adverse selection in subsequent
trading and cause breakdowns in liquidity.
A basic problem in viewing nancial expertise as an arms race is addressing the more fun-
damental question of why anyone would acquire information about a common-value object when
doing so creates adverse selection problems that limit gains to trade. In most models with adverse
selection in nance, some party is exogenously asymmetrically informed. If they could (publicly)
avoid becoming informed, they would do so.
For example, in the classic setting described in Myers and Majluf (1984), an owner-manager-
entrepreneur wishes to nance investment in a new project by selling securities to outsiders who
know less about the intrinsic value of his existing assets than he does. The positive Net Present
Value of this new investment is common knowledge. The entrepreneur is assumed to have acquired
his information through his past history managing the rm. This informational advantage, however,
is an impediment to the entrepreneur in his dealings with the nancial markets, as it costs him
2gains to trade associated with the NPV of the new investment. If he could manage the rm's
assets eectively without acquiring this information, he would do so in order to minimize frictions
associated with nancing. Similarly, used-car dealers would not choose to employ expert mechanics
if they could manage the car dealership without them and thus avoid the costs of the lemons
problem in dealing with customers.
Given the obvious value of precommitting not to acquire information, why do we see nancial
rms, whose major business is intermediating and facilitating trading, investing vast resources in
expertise that speeds and improves their ability to acquire and process information about the assets
they trade? Indeed, as these entities have hired more Ph.D. graduates in nance, economics, and
mathematics, and built up the elaborate information systems required to support their activities,
they have increased the complexity and opacity of the nancial instruments the experts and expert-
systems are used to evaluate. That this has a social cost in the form of adverse-selection problems
is quite evident from the massive breakdowns in liquidity associated with the sub-prime mortgage
crises.
A recent paper by Dang (2008) oers a model of endogenous information acquisition in alternating-
oer bargaining. The model illustrates why traders might decide to acquire costly information about
a common-value asset, even though the anticipation of that acquisition may lead trade to break
down in equilibrium. In Dang's model, a buyer and a seller bargain over an asset with uncertain
value and symmetric gains to trade. Each party has the opportunity to pay a cost, which is exoge-
nous and symmetric across the buyer and seller, to determine the value of the asset. Such a model
of the trading process is suited to an environment where traders become informed as a matter of
choice, rather than as a necessary consequence of doing business. This abstracts from other reasons
intermediaries might have private information about the value of the assets they trade, but doing
so allows us to highlight incentives to over invest in both information and nancial expertise. The
bargaining mechanism employed in the model is simple and tractable, but it shares with more
complex mechanisms the feature that adverse selection leads to breakdowns in trade.1
In our model, long-lived agents encounter randomly chosen counterparties each period, and
1More general bargaining mechanisms are discussed in more detail in the next section.
3bargain over a nancial asset in a setting similar to Dang's model.2 At an initial date, however,
agents can invest resources to lower the costs of acquiring information about the nancial assets
they expect to trade. We interpret these initial investments as building nancial expertise. We
show that intermediaries face a prisoner's dilemma that drives them to invest in expertise just to the
point where, under normal circumstances, additional investments would lead trade to break down
because of adverse selection. The resulting equilibrium is therefore delicate. Jumps in volatility
lead to market failures. Even when occasional high-volatility regimes are anticipated ex ante, agents
optimally overinvest in expertise even though this leads to market failures and a loss of gains to
trade when volatility is high.
The model in our paper is naturally interpreted as trading in an over-the-counter market, since
trade involves bilateral bargaining rather than intermediation through a specialist or an exchange.
Most of the complex securities associated with high levels of nancial expertise are traded over the
counter|including mortgage- and asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
credit default swaps (CDSs), currencies, and xed-income products such as treasury, sovereign,
corporate, and municipal debt. Several models of over-the-counter trading have been proposed in
the literature, such as Due, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) and Due, Garleanu and Pedersen
(2007). In these models search frictions and relative bargaining power are the sources of illiquidity.
The search frictions are taken as exogenous. Investments in \expertise" that reduced search frictions
would be welfare enhancing, and would lead to greater gains to trade. In contrast, adverse selection
is the central friction in our model. Investments in expertise are socially wasteful and put gains to
trade at risk.
Other models such as Carlin (2008) view nancial complexity as increasing costs to counter-
parties. In Carlin (2008), however, the nancial intermediary directly manipulates search costs to
consumers, so these costs are most naturally interpreted as hidden fees for mutual funds, bank
accounts, credit cards, and other consumer nancial products. Our intent is to model an arms
race among equals|intermediaries trading with each other in the nancial markets. We interpret
2This portion of our analysis in Section 4 generalizes Dang's model to allow for asymmetric costs, as this is required
to study the impact of investments that lower the costs of information acquisition. Dang's analysis of the situations
where the rst mover in the bargaining game is informed contains errors that alter the nature of the solution. We
provide a more complete characterization of the equilibria, as well as correcting these errors.
4nancial expertise as a relative advantage in verifying the value of a common-value nancial asset
in an environment where the complexity of the security, or the opacity of the trading venue, makes
this costly.
Economists since Hirshleifer (1971) have recognized that in a competitive equilibrium, private
incentives may lead agents to overinvest in information gathering activities that have redistributive
consequences but no social value. Our model captures, in addition, the potential these investments
have to create adverse selection, and thus destroy value beyond the resources invested directly in
acquiring information. In addition, agents in our model behave strategically, rather than competi-
tively, so we can capture the prisoner's dilemma they face, which drives them to invest in expertise
in gathering information.
The general notion that economic actors may over-invest in professional services that help them
compete in a zero-sum game goes back at least to Ashenfelter and Bloom (1993), which empirically
studies labor arbitration hearings and argues that outcomes are unaected by legal representation,
as long as both parties have lawyers. A party that is not represented, when his or her opponent has
a lawyer, suers from a signicant disadvantage. In this setting, however, the investment in legal
services is not destructive of value beyond the fees paid to the lawyers. In our setting, expertise in
nance has the potential to cause breakdowns in trade since it creates adverse selection.
Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) draw parallels between legal and -
nancial services in arguing that countries with large service sectors devoted to such \rent-seeking"
activities grow less quickly than economies where talented individuals are attracted to more en-
trepreneurial careers. They do not directly model the source of rent extraction, as we do.
Hauswald and Marquez (2006) show that banks will overinvest in acquiring information, as
they sometimes do in our model. The banks in their model, however, acquire information about
the credit worthiness of borrowers because it softens price competition between the banks as they
compete for market share. Information is socially useful in their setting in eciently allocating
credit. We model the interaction between nancial intermediaries in their role as traders, where
higher expertise facilitates the (inecient) acquisition of information and leads to periodic break
downs in trade that can naturally be interpreted as periods of illiquidity.
5The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. Section 3
informally describes the central tradeos that drive the results. Section 4 studies the equilibria of
the subgame where nancial rms meet and bargain over the price of an asset. In Section 5 we
evaluate the decision to invest in nancial expertise, and prove our main result. Section 6 concludes
and outlines directions for extensions and additional research. Proofs of lemmas and propositions,
along with some other technical derivations, are contained in the Appendix. A supplementary
appendix, available from the authors or on their websites, provides a detailed analysis of the
uniqueness and symmetry of the equilibrium in expertise.
2 Model
There is a continuum of risk-neutral and innitely-lived nancial intermediaries or traders. In each
period t, t = 1;:::;1, trader i meets a random counterparty drawn from the set of potential
traders, and they have the opportunity to exchange a nancial security. When they meet, agent
i is assigned the role of buyer or seller with equal probability, and his counterparty assumes the
other role. At t = 0 trader i can invest resources, denoted ei, in nancial expertise. This serves to
lower the cost of acquiring information about the values of the assets he will be bargaining over in
future trading encounters.
The asset traded in any given encounter has a common-value component, v. Private values to
the buyer and seller generate gains to trade. The buyer's valuation of the object is v + , and the
seller's valuation is v   . The gains to trade are common knowledge and constant through time.
The common value is independently distributed through time. It can be high, v = vh, or low,
v = vl, with equal probability. The distance between the two possible values is a measure of the
uncertainty about that asset's value, or its volatility. We assume the common values are drawn
from two possible regimes, high-volatility and low-volatility. The high-volatility regime is dened by
more uncertainty concerning the common value|a larger distance between the possible outcomes
for the common value, (vh   vl). The high volatility regime occurs infrequently, with probability
, compared to the low-volatility regime. Traders know, when they engage in bargaining, whether
they are in the high or the low volatility regime. They do not, however, know whether the value of
6the asset is high or low unless they incur a cost to acquire that information. Our central result is
that for any size jump in volatility there is a suciently small  such that it is an equilibrium for the
traders to invest in expertise even though it results in liquidity breakdowns when the high-volatility
regime occurs.
Suppose i is the seller and j is the buyer in a particular trading encounter. Then at a cost of
cs = c(ei) the seller can engage in research activities to evaluate the asset and determine its value.
The cost of determining the value to the buyer is cb = c(ej). We will refer to a decision to incur
this cost as a decision to \investigate." The cost of investigation, c(e), is positive, continuous, twice
continuously dierentiable, convex, and monotonically decreasing in the resources invested at date
zero in building expertise (c0(e) < 0;c00(e) > 0). Expertise, which can be viewed as both human
capital and the infrastructure to support it, allows a trader or an institution to more quickly and
eciently value a security. We assume that all agents who do not acquire expertise face the same
investigation cost, c(0) > 0.
Trading is an ultimatum game as in Dang (2008). The buyer decides, rst, whether or not to
pay the cost cb to learn the asset's value, and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the seller
to exchange the asset at price p. The seller decides whether to pay the cost cs, and determine
the value of the asset, and then whether to accept the oer. The seller's investigation decision is,
thus, conditioned on the buyer's oer. If the buyer's price is accepted, trade occurs and the buyer
receives a payo of
v +    p
while the seller gets
p   (v   ):
This trading game is a relatively simple mechanism, in which the consequences of adverse se-
lection are stark and (relatively) straightforward to characterize. The resulting tractability allows
us to endogenize the acquisition of information, and the investment in expertise. We can then
highlight the tradeo between bargaining power gained with expertise and the increased risk of
illiquidity, which is our central focus. The eects adverse selection has on trading outcomes in this
7setting, however, are similar to those in more complex and general mechanisms. Trade \breaks
down" when parties bargaining are asymmetrically informed about valuations, even if it is common
knowledge that there are gains to trade. For example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demon-
strate that no bilateral trading mechanism (without external subsidies) achieves ecient ex-post
outcomes. Ecient mechanisms all involve mixed strategies that with non-zero probability lead to
inecient allocations. Samuelson (1984) shows that when only the responder is informed, exchange
occurs if and only if the proposer can successfully make a take-or-leave it oer, as we assume he can
in our model. Admati and Perry (1987) show in pure strategy bargaining games that asymmetric
information results in costly delays in bargaining. Thus, illiquidity, or the loss of gains to trade in
some circumstances, is a general feature of bilateral bargaining with asymmetric information. It is
in no way unique to our setting.
We assume that all random variables are drawn independently across time, and that the trad-
ing histories of rms are not observable, consistent with the opacity of OTC markets. Levels of
expertise, which are the result of investments made at t = 0, are known to all counterparties. These
assumptions ensure that agent i plays the same trading game in each period, conditional on the
expertise of his counterparty.
Reversing the role of the buyer and seller, as proposer or responder, has no eect on our results
beyond notational complexities, since we assume that agents do not know who will be the buyer and
who will be the seller until they meet. They invest in expertise before this, at t = 0. We assume
what is predetermined is who moves rst, buyer or seller, and then allow uncertainty over who
becomes buyer and who becomes seller. Alternatively, we could assume that it is predetermined
which agent is buyer or seller, and that who moves rst is uncertain. This would add notational
complexity, since the two cases (buyer moves rst or seller moves rst) would need to be tracked
through the subgame. What is important for our results is that, at the point when they decide to
invest in expertise, the agents face symmetry with respect to their chances of being the proposer
or responder in the ultimatum trading game.
Information acquired by paying cs or cb has no social value in this model. It simply serves
to increase one's share of a xed pie, unless it destroys value by shutting down trade due to
8adverse selection. Similarly, investments in expertise, since they only serve to alter the information
acquisition costs, are also socially wasteful. We are abstracting from any broader benets to
expertise and information acquisition, such as improved risk sharing or better coordination of real
investment due to more informative prices. This highlights the incentives to engage in an arms race
in expertise, despite the costs of adverse selection it engenders. In a more general model, where
information and expertise in acquiring and eciently processing it do add value, the incentives we
highlight would lead to overinvestment in nancial expertise.
3 Outline of Central Tradeos
In each bargaining subgame, the gains to trade are 2. Under symmetric information, since each
party moves rst half the time, the expected surplus to each is .
Consider rst the two extreme cases.
With cs = cb = 0 it is simple to show that acquiring information is always a best response for
the responder. Given this, the rst-mover will also acquire information. Trade occurs at two fully
informed prices of vh    and vl    and all gains to trade are realized.
Similarly, if the costs are very high regardless of expertise, then in equilibrium neither party
will acquire information, trade occurs at p = E(v)   , and the buyer extracts all the gains to
trade.
Most of the intuition driving our results can be illustrated by considering the eect of the seller's
information cost on the strategies and payos around the point where those costs are so high that
the buyer can extract the full surplus. The critical level of the investigation cost for the responder




which Dang (2008) refers to as the \gains from speculation." The quantity (vh   vl) also has
a natural interpretation in nancial settings as a measure of volatility, or uncertainty about the
asset's fundamental value. Thus, the incentive to investigate, which is socially wasteful, is more
9dicult to resist when volatility is high. Learning whether an asset is worth 50 or 150 is more
valuable than learning whether it is worth 99 or 101.
Assume the buyer does not acquire information, and attempts to extract all the surplus by
oering p = E(v) . If the seller accepts the oer, he gets an expected payo of zero. If he pays
the cost to investigate and determine the value, he will only sell if v = vl. Trade will occur with




[p   (vl   )]   cs =
1
2




(vh   vl)   cs: (1)
The seller will not investigate when gains from speculation, net of the cost of investigation, are
negative. Thus, if the seller's cost is suciently high, the buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it oer,
and extract the full surplus of 2. The buyer will do this irrespective of his own information
acquisition cost, since he cannot do better than an expected payo of 2.
Now suppose cs is slightly lower than 1




(vh   vl)   cs:
If the buyer oers the seller's unconditional reservation price in this situation, he knows the seller
will investigate and only sell if the value is low. This subjects the buyer to adverse selection, and
occasions a loss of the gains to trade half of the time. By oering a slightly higher price,
p = E(v)    + ;
where  > 0, the buyer may be able to \bribe" the seller to accept the oer unconditionally. If
the seller investigates he will have to pay cs. He will only trade, and collect the \bribe," half of
the time. If the seller accepts unconditionally, he earns the full price premium, , and saves the
information acquisition cost.
10The unconditional-trade outcome is obviously better for the buyer. If the seller accepts uncon-
ditionally he gains the full surplus of 2, less the price premium of , while if the seller investigates
the gains to trade are lost half of the time and, worse, when trade does occur he buys at an average
price and loses money because the asset's value is low.
How big must the price premium  be? If the seller investigates, his payo is
1
2
[(E(v)    + )   (vl   )]   cs =
1
4








If he accepts unconditionally, the seller receives . For the latter to be attractive to the seller, we
must have   2". The buyer wants to pay as little as possible, and so the equilibrium price will
be:
p = E(v)    + 2"




(vh   vl)   cs

= vh      2cs: (3)




(vh   vl)   2cs
while the buyer earns
2   2" = 2  
1
2
(vh   vl) + 2cs:
Notice the the payos of the buyer and seller are symmetric and linear in the seller's cost and
do not depend on the buyer's cost. The lower the seller's cost, the more credible the seller's threat
to investigate, which would create adverse selection and destroy gains to trade, and the higher the
price premium the buyer must oer to prevent this.
Now consider the consequences of allowing the traders to invest resources at an initial date|
11to build nancial expertise that lowers the information acquisition costs they face in subsequent
trading. At date zero, when investments are made in nancial expertise, an agent has an equal
chance of becoming the buyer or seller on encountering a counterparty. Suppose all agents invest
zero in expertise, ei = ej = 0, and that at zero investment the cost of investigation rules out
information acquisition by the seller, c(0) > 1
4(vh   vl). In equilibrium at these costs, the buyer
makes an unconditional oer that extracts the full surplus from the seller, p = E(v) , and earns
a surplus of 2, while the seller earns no surplus.
This gives the traders a powerful incentive to lower their respective investigation costs. If agent
i can invest to the point where c(ei) < 1
4(vh   vl) he is pushed into the region where, whenever he
is the seller, he captures part of the surplus. The price the buyer pays him increases linearly as his
cost declines. By lowering his costs agent i protects himself in subsequent bargaining whenever he
turns out to be the seller. This costs him nothing when he turns out to be the buyer, because the
division of surplus depends only on the seller's costs. When agent i is the buyer, his opponent's costs
are the result of his opponent's investment choice, which is taken as given in a Nash equilibrium.
As long as the resources invested in expertise, ei, are less than the discounted value of half the
seller's surplus in the subgame at the lower cost, it is a dominant strategy to make the investment
in expertise.
By symmetry the same arguments apply to any other agent j, so the resulting prisoner's dilemma
will force the agents to invest in expertise to lower investigation costs that, in that particular
subgame, they never pay anyway.
Facing agent j in a particular trading encounter, agent i receives a surplus of 1
2(vh vl) 2c(ei)
as the seller, and a surplus of  1
2(vh   vl) + 2 + 2c(ej) as the buyer. Agent i's expected surplus
across the two possibilities is
   [c(ei)   c(ej)]: (4)
Note that this is half the total surplus of 2, less the excess of his cost over that of the other
agent. Taking his counterparty's expertise as given, each agent has an incentive to increase his own
expertise, as it helps him when he is the responding party in bargaining, but has no eect on his
payos when he is the proposer.
12Where will the traders stop investing? What, beyond the curvature of the function c(), limits
the arms race? One possibility is that the price premium paid by the proposing buyer to the
responding seller increases to the point where the seller is absorbing the entire surplus. Then any
additional investment will make any oer by the buyer unprotable, and trade will simply break
down. Another possibility is that the buyer's share of the surplus will decline to the point where he
will be better o acquiring information himself. The trading game then becomes a signalling game,
in which all equilibria involve mixed strategies that rule out fully ecient trade. The analysis in
the next section is devoted to delineating these boundaries formally.
In either case, the players will have incentives to keep investing until their costs reach such a
boundary. At that point any decrease in their cost, or, alternatively, an increase in the volatility
from (vh   vl) =  to (vh   vl) = , where  > 1, will lead to breakdowns in trade. In Section 5
we demonstrate this formally by showing that for any  > 1, if the probability of the high-volatility
regime, , is low enough, then traders will invest in expertise until they reach the boundary for
ecient trade in the low volatility regime. In such an equilibrium, as is clear from expression (4),
the investigation costs have no eect on the eciency of trade under normal conditions of low
volatility. These costs are not actually paid in equilibrium. The ex-ante expected surplus from
the trading game is the same as when costs exceed 1
4(vh   vl), because the gains one obtains as a
seller are oset by the higher price paid as a buyer. The deadweight loss is limited to the resources
expended building expertise, ei. If volatility randomly increases trade breaks down due to adverse
selection. That is, along with an \arms race," we occasionally have a \war" in which the surplus
the players are competing for is either partly or entirely destroyed.
Under normal conditions of low volatility in our model, nancial expertise serves as a threat
in bargaining with counterparties, but it is not actually used in equilibrium. We do not mean to
imply that highly trained and compensated nancial professionals literally \do nothing" for their
pay. Rather, these arguments illustrate that part of their value to their rms, and thus of their
compensation, is due to their ability to deter others from opportunistic behavior. From a social
perspective, they might be viewed as overqualied for the routine activities associated with their
work. By analogy, the most highly paid divorce lawyers might well neutralize each other's impact
13on the division of the divorcing couple's assets. This does not imply that they are twiddling their
thumbs during their billable hours. In equilibrium, the tasks they perform might be performed as
competently by lawyers with less experience, expertise, and reputation who would charge less, but
those lawyers would not serve to deter the other party's more expensive counsel.
4 The trading subgame
For certain regions of the parameters and investigation costs, the rst mover in the trading game
may choose to become informed. This creates a signaling game, in which the proposer's oered price
can reveal information to the responder. Agents will generally employ mixed strategies, creating an
endogenous positive probability of trade breakdown. We will rst analyze the subgame assuming
the buyer, who is the rst mover or proposer in the trading game, never investigates, and then
study the subgame where the rst mover is informed. The nal subsection then evaluates when
the buyer will choose to become informed, comparing his payos in the various subgames. We
assume throughout the analysis that when indierent between multiple responses that yield the
same expected payo, the responder (or seller) chooses the one that is best for the proposer (or
buyer).
4.1 Subgame with uninformed buyer
Assume the buyer, who makes the take-it-or-leave-it oer, does not acquire information. In this
subgame, the equilibrium price will depend only on the seller's investigation cost, cs.
First, note that we can ignore prices p < vl   , where the seller would not trade regardless of
his information, or p > E(v) + , where the buyer would never trade given that he is uninformed.
For any p between these bounds, if the seller investigates, he sells only if v = vl. The seller's
expected surplus at the point he decides to investigate is then
1
2
[p   (vl   )]   cs (5)
14and the buyer's expected surplus is
1
2
(vl +    p):
If the seller does not investigate, and accepts the oered price, the seller's surplus is
p   [E(v)   ] (6)
while the buyer receives
E(v) +    p:
If the seller does not investigate and refuses the oer both parties get zero.
In any situation where there is trade, regardless of the seller's response, the buyer's payo
decreases in the price. For any given response by the seller, therefore, the buyer will oer the
lowest price that sustains that response. Accordingly, we need only consider three candidate prices.
There is a minimum price that would cause a seller to reject the oer rather than investigating.
This price, p
1, sets (5) equal to zero and is given by
p
1 = vl    + 2cs: (7)
There is a unique price at which the seller is indierent between investigating and trading without
information. This price sets (5) equal to (6), and is given by
p
2 = vh      2cs: (8)
Finally, there is the lowest price that keeps an uninformed seller from rejecting the oer and earning
zero. This sets (6) equal to zero and is given by
p
3 = E(v)   : (9)
We present four lemmas that exhaust the possible outcomes to the subgame when the buyer
is uninformed. The logic of the proofs, which are in the Appendix, generally follows Dang (2008),
15allowing for asymmetric costs. The rst result shows that if costs are high enough, ecient trade
always occurs.
Lemma 1 When the buyer does not acquire information and cs > 1
4(vh   vl), then in the unique
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to the trading subgame:
1. The seller does not investigate.
2. Trade always takes place.
3. The price is p
3 = E(v)   .
4. The buyer's expected surplus is 2.
5. The seller's expected surplus is zero.
The next result details two sets of conditions when the surplus is split between the two coun-
terparties, and plays a central role in our subsequent analysis. In these regions, the payos to
the seller are decreasing in his costs of investigation, providing him with incentives to improve his
bargaining position by investing in expertise and lowering these costs.
Lemma 2 When the buyer does not acquire information and either or both of the following condi-
tions hold
(a.) maxf; 1
4(vh   vl)   g < cs  1
4(vh   vl);
(b.) 1
6(vh   vl)   1
3 < cs  minf; 1
4(vh   vl)g;
then in the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to the trading subgame:
1. The seller does not investigate.
2. Trade always takes place.
3. The price is p
2 = vh      2cs.




(vh   vl) + 2 + 2cs:
5. The seller's expected surplus is
1
2
(vh   vl)   2cs:
16The next result shows that when costs are suciently low, the seller investigates and some gains
to trade are lost when value is high.
Lemma 3 When the buyer does not acquire information and cs  minf; 1
6(vh   vl)   1
3g, then
in the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to the trading subgame:
1. The seller investigates and trades only if v = vl.
2. The price is p
1 = vl    + 2cs.
3. The buyer's expected surplus is
   cs:
4. The seller's expected surplus is zero.
Finally, we must consider what happens when the buyer cannot make a protable trade, either
by making an oer that leads the seller to investigate or by making an oer that prevents the seller
from investigating.
Lemma 4 When the buyer does not gather information and  < cs < 1
4(vh   vl)   , then in the
set of perfect Bayesian Equilibria to the trading subgame:
1. The seller does not investigate.
2. The buyer oers a price p < vl    + 2cs.
3. Trade never occurs.
4. The buyer's expected surplus is zero.
5. The seller's expected surplus is zero.
Figure 1 illustrates the full set of possible outcomes associated with the four lemmas above.
While there are ve possible cases, depending on the relative magnitudes of the gains to trade, ,
and the volatility, vh   vl, all of them share the following structure. For high levels of the seller's
information acquisition cost, cs  1
4(vh vl), trade takes place with probability one, and the buyer,
as rst mover, extracts the full surplus. Below this region is an area described by Lemma 2, where
17trade takes place with certainty, but the buyer and seller split the surplus. The buyer must share
enough of the surplus with the seller to keep him from investigating, in order to preserve the gains
to trade when value is high. As is clear from Lemma 2, this payment increases as the seller's cost
declines and the threat to investigate becomes more credible. The seller's share of the surplus is
maximized at the lower boundary of this region, which depends on the relative magnitudes of the
gains to trade, , and the volatility, (vh  vl). Below the region covered by Lemma 2, trade breaks
down in whole or in part. In Cases 2-4, for low values of the seller's cost of investigation, the seller
investigates and declines the buyer's oer when the value is high. In all these situations the seller
earns zero surplus (see Lemma 3). In Case 1 there is also an intermediate region where the surplus
the buyer would need to pay the seller to discourage investigation is too high for the buyer to break
even, and trade breaks down entirely as shown in Lemma 4.
4.2 The trading game with an informed rst mover
In this section, we analyze the game under the assumption that the buyer has acquired information.
Our analysis of this situation diers substantially from the results in Dang (2008).3
When the rst mover in the trading game becomes informed with positive probability, then
the trading game becomes a signaling game. We begin the analysis of the buyer's decision about
whether to become informed by noting two simple features of the model.
First, if the seller's investigation cost is high enough to discourage him from ever investigating,
cs > 1
4(vh   vl) as in Lemma 1, then it would never pay for the buyer to become informed about
the asset if cb > 0. Since the buyer earns the entire surplus of 2 in this situation, he cannot
improve his bargaining power in any way by investigating, and investigating involves a positive
cost. Thus, outcomes are rst-best if the seller's costs are high enough. For this case we have fully
characterized the equilibrium.
3There are several algebraic mistakes in the proofs of Dang (2008) for this situation, which we note in our analysis
below and in the Appendix. As a result our expressions for the equilibrium prices are quite dierent than his, and
the equilibrium that is best for the buyer will in some circumstances not exist. In addition, we note that Dang (2008)
treats each price oered by the informed rst-mover as initiating a proper subgame. In fact, there is a continuum of
equilibria that are perfect Bayesian.
18Lemma 5 If cs > 1
4(vh vl), then for any value of cb > 0, the buyer chooses not to become informed
about the value of the asset and the equilibrium quantities are given in Lemma 1.
Second, as Dang (2008) shows, once the buyer does become informed, there are no best responses
in pure strategies, so any equilibrium to the trading subgame must involve mixed strategies. If
the buyer learns v, and truthfully oers pl = vl    or ph = vh   , the seller would always
accept without investigating. But given that strategy for the seller, the buyer could, with positive
probability, oer pl when v = vh and be better o. If, on the other hand, the seller refuses any oer
less than p = vh   , the buyer should always oer that price when v = vh. But given a truthful
oer when value is high, the seller should accept a price of vl    when value is low, as it reveals
the truth. Thus, truthful oers are not an equilibrium, and neither is always oering a high price.
Similar arguments also imply that the seller will never investigate with probability one when the
buyer is informed. If the seller always investigates, he will reject any oer that is not truthful. This
implies, however, that the buyer will never make a misleading oer, as it costs him gains to trade.
If the buyer is always truthful, then the seller has no incentive to incur the costs of investigation.
We now introduce two new critical prices. The rst is the lowest price at which a seller will not
expect to lose money regardless of his beliefs:
p
h = vh   :
The second critical price is :
p










vh   vl   4cs

:
This will turn out to be the equilibrium price in the best equilibrium for the buyer when the buyer
investigates and the value is low or when the value is high and the buyer attempts to exploit his
private information by oering a price that will give the seller a negative payo if he accepts.4
4Our expression for z
 is completely dierent than that in Step 3d in the Appendix of Dang (2008).
19It is immediate that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium no price above p
h will ever be oered.
As is typical in signaling games, where the informed party moves rst, there are many perfect
Bayesian equilibria, reecting the many possible equilibrium beliefs the responding party might
have about the buyer's type as a consequence of the oered price. We will focus on the equilibrium
most favorable to the buyer. This is equivalent to assuming that the buyer can announce and
commit to a nite set of prices he will charge before observing the true value.
We show that in the subgames where the buyer investigates the equilibria all involve two possible
prices. When the buyer observes a low value, he always oers p
l . When he observes a high value,
however, he mixes between this price and oering the seller p
h. When the seller accepts the low
price in the high-value state, without investigating, then the buyer is earning information rents.
Our proof of the two lemmas below shows that the buyer never mixes over more than two prices.
In some circumstances, described by Lemma 7, there is a continuum of equilibria, each involving a
dierent p
l , but all of them have the structure that the buyer oers that price when value is low,
and mixes across it and p
h when value is high.
The following two lemmas describe the optimal equilibrium for the buyer in the subgame in
which he decides to become informed.
Lemma 6 When cs 
2(vh vl)2
(vh vl+2)2 and the buyer acquires information, then in the optimal Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium from the perspective of the buyer:
1. If the buyer observes v = vl, the buyer oers the price p
l .
2. Using z = 1
2





vh   vl   4cs








3. The seller buys if the buyer oers p
h.
4. If the buyer oers p
l , the seller investigates with probability
2
vh   vl + 2   cs
and sells only if the value is low.
5. If the seller does not investigate, he always sells.
206. The buyer obtains a surplus of




7. The seller receives zero surplus.
Lemma 7 When 1
4(vh   vl) > cs >
2(vh vl)2
(vh vl+2)2, the least upper bound of the payos to the buyer
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by
   cb +
22
vh   vl + 2
;
while the greatest lower bound for the seller's payo is zero. In any sequence of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria whose payo to the buyer converges to the least upper bound:
1. The price oered by the buyer when v = vl converges to vl   .
2. The probability that the price oered by the buyer when v = vh is p
h converges to 1.
3. The probability that the seller sells after seeing an oer of pl converges to
2
vh   vl + 2
:
4. The probability that the seller investigates converges to 0.
Lemma 7 describes the limit of the equilibria that are best for the buyer when the seller's costs
lie in an intermediate range. Equilibria exist in which the buyer can drive the seller arbitrarily close
to his participation constraint, or a zero expected payo. He would achieve this in an equilibrium
where his oered price always revealed the truth, where the seller accepted unconditionally, and
where the price when value is low was vl  (i.e., z = 0). We know, however, from the arguments
at the beginning of this section, that truth telling is not an equilibrium. The buyer must, with
some positive probability, oer a low price when the value is high, but some surplus will accrue
to the seller by making that oered price higher. Hence, the buyer will nd optimal to keep the
probability of oering a low price when he knows the value is high as small as possible without
reaching zero.
214.3 The rst mover's information acquisition decision
Given the costs of investigation for the buyer and seller, the buyer will decide whether or not
to investigate the value of the asset by comparing his payos in the various subgames when he
is informed (Lemmas 6 and 7) and when he is not (Lemmas 1-4). A formal derivation of the
boundaries between the various lemmas is provided in Part B of the Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the set of choices for the buyer and seller described by various lemmas.
Across the four panels, we vary the ratio of volatility to gains from trade,
(vh vl)
 . (For lower values
of this ratio, the resulting gures all resemble Panel (a), while for higher values they resemble
Panel (d).) In each panel the cost pairs are divided into sections, numbered according to the
lemma that describes play in the corresponding subgame. The dashed 45-degree line describes the
set of symmetric cost pairs that could result from a symmetric equilibrium in nancial expertise,
where the potential counterparties' investments at date zero determine their investigation costs.
As we show in the next section, the only equilibria that involve pure strategies in the choice of
expertise are symmetric ones. The heavy lines separate regions where the rst mover, or buyer,
investigates. The boundary is derived simply by comparing the payos to the buyer from when he
does not acquire information (Lemma 1 to Lemma 4, depending on the value of cs) to the value
when he does acquire information (Lemma 6 or Lemma 7). In each panel the lower left-hand corner,
where the costs of both the proposer and responder are low, correspond to Lemmas 6 and 7. To
the right of and above these cost pairs, the proposer does not pay for information and makes an
uninformed oer. That region, in turn, is divided into areas corresponding to Lemma 1, where high
costs for the seller and buyer lead to ecient bargaining outcomes, through Lemma 4, where no
trade occurs. Note that the buyer's decision to investigate depends on the seller's costs, because he
anticipates that party's response. The cost at which he decides not to become informed rst rises
and then falls in the seller's costs. The rate at which the buyer's payo changes in the seller's costs
varies, as we move between the regions in the gure, leading to this reversal.
Note that in every parameterization in Figure 2 the 45-degree line does not pass through the
area associated with Lemma 7. This rules out symmetric equilibria in expertise with subgames in
22the region where the optimal equilibrium for the buyer does not exist.5 Rather, the choices over
expertise in symmetric equilibria will put the agents at the boundaries between areas governed by
Lemmas 2 and 4, where the buyer is uninformed, or Lemmas 2 and 6, where the buyer investigates
before making an oer.
5 Investing in expertise
In this section we consider the equilibrium choices of investment in expertise, and show that an
arms race occurs. We will show that in equilibrium, for most parameter values and cost functions,
c(e), investments in expertise reduce investigation costs to the lower boundary of Lemma 2.
We assume the common values are drawn from two possible regimes, high-volatility and low-
volatility. In the normal, or low-volatility regime, vh  vl = . This regime occurs with probability
1   . The high-volatility regime occurs infrequently, with probability . The two possible values
are then further apart: vh   vl = , where  > 1. Traders know, when they engage in bargaining,
whether they are in the high or the low volatility regime.
We focus on equilibria that are symmetric in the choice of expertise. These equilibria are a
natural focal point, since it can be shown that with  = 0 there are no asymmetric, pure-strategy
equilibria in expertise.6 Our main result shows that the equilibria that prevail when there is only
one, low-volatility regime ( = 0) survive when  is positive but suciently small.
We will begin by outlining the intuition behind the arms race as an equilibrium when  = 0, so
that the agents anticipate only one possible value for volatility. The proposition that follows then
formally proves this is an equilibrium, and further that the same equilibrium survives when  > 0,
but small.
Accordingly, consider candidate equilibria on the dashed 45-degree lines in Figure 2. In Panel
(c),where  = 1
9(vh   vl), the boundary between the regions described by Lemmas 2, 4, and 6
intersect the 45-degree line through the origin, where investigation costs are symmetric. The costs
5From the expression for the boundary of the buyer's information acquisition decision it is straightforward to
verify this for all
vh vl
 > 0.
6A formal proof of this is in a supplementary appendix, available on the authors' web sites or on request from the
authors.
23at this point dene a level of expertise e = c 1(5
4). When volatility is lower (Figure 2, panels (a)
and (b)), the diagonal crosses the boundary between Lemmas 6 and 2, while if volatility is higher
(Panel (d)) the diagonal passes through the Lemma 4 region, where trade does not occur.
If we consider, rst, the case in Panel (d), where volatility is high, it is immediately obvious that
no symmetric cost pair in which play proceeds according to Lemma 4 can be an equilibrium with
positive investment in expertise. The agents would be investing resources to build expertise but
not enjoying any benet from their investment. Since investment in expertise is costly, they could
unilaterally reduce this investment at date zero at no cost to their payos in subsequent trading.
The boundary between Lemmas 2 and 4, however, is a natural candidate for an equilibrium.
Here each agent gains the full surplus as a seller. Deviations that involve additional investment in
expertise will move the agents into the region governed by Lemma 4, where both parties earn zero.
Even higher levels of investment will move agents into the region governed by Lemma 6. There, the
additional expertise benets the agent when he is the buyer, but because mixed strategies imply
some loss in gains to trade, these benets must be less than the loss of the full surplus of 2 he
earns at the lower, equilibrium expertise when he is the seller.
A similar logic governs the choices when volatility is lower. Then the 45-degree line crosses
the boundary between Lemmas 2 and 6. At that point, he does not earn zero as a buyer and 2
as a seller. The boundary in this case is such that the buyer's surplus in the subgame where he
investigates is equal to his surplus when he does not and play proceeds according to Lemma 2. His
expected surplus in Lemma 2 across his roles as both buyer and seller equals the full gains to trade.
Under Lemma 6, in contrast, he earns zero as a seller and less than 2 as a buyer, because the
mixed strategies necessarily imply loss of gains to trade.
Indeed, in all situations where investing in expertise provides a sucient decrease in costs, both
agents will invest in expertise up to the point where any additional investment in expertise would
move them out of the Lemma 2 region.
Now suppose there is some small probability,  > 0, that volatility will jump to . This moves
the boundaries in Figure 2 to the upper right, or northeast. At the equilibrium point described
above, the traders then nd themselves in the interior of the no-trade or the mixed-strategy regions
24in the gure, with a consequent loss of gains to trade. They can avoid this by reducing their
investment in expertise. Since the jump in volatility is discrete, however, the decrease in expertise
must be non-innitesimal as well, leading to a discrete drop in the expected benets to the trader
in the low-volatility regime. For a suciently small , the loss in benets in the low-volatility state
will exceed the gains to reduced expertise in the high-volatility regime. The traders will be better
o remaining at the high expertise they would choose if  = 0. Occasional jumps in volatility thus
lead to breakdowns in liquidity|an unwillingness to trade due to adverse selection and despite
gains to trade that are common knowledge.
The next proposition, which is the central result of the paper, formalizes these arguments.
Recall that in the low-volatility regime, vh  vl = , and in the high-volatility regime vh  vl = ,
where  > 1.















(A). For any 
 > 0, when  = 0 and positive investment in expertise is an equilibrium, there exists
an equilibrium in which both agents invest in expertise at the level e if and only if c0(e)   (1 ).
If c0(e) 2 [ 2(1   ); (1   )], then e is a unique equilibrium level of expertise. If instead
c0(e) >  (1 ), the level of expertise e0 (< e) such that c0(e0) =  (1 ) is the unique equilibrium.
(B). For any 
 > 0 and  > 1, if e is the equilibrium in (A), there is a  > 0 such that, for all
 < , there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where both agents invest in expertise up to e
and play proceeds according to Lemma 2 in the low-volatility regime. However, in the high-volatility




 2 (9; 28
3 ) while  
[ 12]2
[28 3] and according to Lemma 6 if 
  9 or if 





In the equilibrium with e = e agents invest to the point at which any further investment would
move them out of Lemma 2 when they are the seller. In the case where 
 > 9, the seller receives
2 and the buyer receives 0. For 
 < 9, the situation is slightly dierent. Agents locate at the
boundary between Lemmas 2 and 6, but this is not the point associated with the full surplus for
25the seller. As can be seen from Figure 2, costs in this equilibrium are such that the seller's cost
exceeds the threshold at which he receives the full surplus, and the surplus is divided between the
buyer and the seller. Play in the low-volatility subgame is ecient in this equilibrium, but the
investment in expertise is wasteful.
As the proposition makes clear, for a wide range of cost functions, e will be the unique equilib-
rium that involves pure strategy investment in expertise. However, when the eect of expertise on
costs remains very strong until costs are very low, there may exist7 another symmetric equilibrium
that involves even greater investment in expertise, with a consequent loss in gains to trade, even
without shifts in the volatility. This equilibrium has play proceeding according to Lemma 6 and is
Pareto dominated by the equilibrium at e.
This can be seen in Figure 3, where we parameterize the model and numerically study the
optimal investment in expertise (Panel A) and the resulting costs of investigation (Panel B). The
cost of information acquisition, as a function of investment in expertise, e, and of the initial cost
of investigation, C0, is




where we set  = 1.
The parameterized function, c(e), is decreasing and strictly convex and satises lime!+1 c(e) =





This property implies that, at e = 0, the \marginal benet" of expertise,  c0(e), is  for all
possible starting values of C0. It also implies that the marginal benet of expertise at a point c(e)
is proportional to the ratio of the current cost c(e) to the initial cost C0. The farther the current
investigation cost is from its starting point, the more expensive it will be to further reduce that
cost.
In the Figure, we set the discount factor,  = 0:9. We normalize  = 1 and set  = 10. The
7Much weaker conditions for uniqueness are available, but the derivation of these is omitted for the sake of space.
Details are available in the supplementary material posted on the authors' websites and available on request.
26probability of the high-volatility regime, , is 5%, and the jump in volatility is 10% ( = 1:1).
The upper panel in Figure 3 shows the best responses in the level of expertise given the initial
cost of investigation, C0, and the cost level of potential counterparties. The bottom panel shows the
costs that result from optimal investment in expertise, given the same variables. The highlighted
line identies the cost pairs (agent's initial cost vs. opponent's nal cost) that constitute symmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nancial expertise. Notice that the costs resulting from optimal
investment in expertise are at, except for very low levels of either the agent's cost or his opponent's
cost. The at level of costs corresponds to 1:5 = c(e) = 1
4(vh  vl) , the lower boundary of the
region given in Lemma 2. That this is the cost associated with optimal expertise in equilibrium, for
a wide range of initial costs, is evident in the fact that this level of cost results from a best response
when the opponent's cost is also 1.5 (the highlighted line where the surface folds up in the gure).
For an agent with a starting cost between 1.5 and 6.69, the best response to an opponent's cost
of 1.5 is to acquire expertise until his investigation cost is also 1.5. Hence, when both agents have
initial costs between 1.5 and 6.69, acquiring expertise until investigation cost is 1.5 is a symmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium is, however, delicate. Since both agents' costs reach the edge of Lemma 2, even
very small increases in volatility will lead to breakdowns in trade. For this set of parameters, when
the high-volatility regime occurs, both agents will end up playing according to Lemma 4 instead.
Trade will therefore break down. In the high volatility state, the buyer prefers not to trade rather
than purchasing a \lemon" from an informed seller. Hence, all the gains to trade are lost in the
high-volatility regime. Note that if we had parameterized asset volatility to be lower, both agents
could end up playing according to Lemma 6 in the high-volatility regime instead of Lemma 4, as
stated in Proposition 1. The probability of trade breaking down would then be lower than 5% since
trade occurs with positive probability in Lemma 6 compared to with zero probability in Lemma 4.
Figure 4 illustrates that for some initial cost values multiple symmetric pure-strategy equilibria
will exist. The gure shows what panel (b) in Figure 3 would look like from above and the
highlighted line identies the cost pairs (agent's initial cost vs. opponent's nal cost) that represent
symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nancial expertise. At very low levels of initial costs,
27i.e., when initial cost is below 1.89, we can see that a (Pareto-dominated) second pure-strategy
equilibrium arises. In such equilibrium, the buyer acquires information before making an oer,
and adverse selection eliminates some gains to trade. As Proposition 1 makes clear, the symmetric
equilibrium at e with c(e) = 1:5 will be unique at least for the region of initial costs where
 2(1   ) < c0(e) <  (1   ). In the current parameterization, that equilibrium is in fact unique
for the larger region where initial costs are between 1.89 and 6.69.8
Figure 5 makes clear that expertise acquisition leading to a delicate trading equilibrium is not
unique to a particular parameterization. It shows the best response level of investment in expertise,
and resulting costs of information acquisition, for parameterizations corresponding to each of Cases
2-5 in Figure 1. We use the same cost function and discount rate and set  = 1 as before, but allow
volatility  to be 8 (Case 2), 6 (Case 3), 4 (Case 4), and 2 (Case 5). In each case, as in Figure 3,
optimal investment in expertise generally pushes the agent to a at level of costs. The exception
occurs when the opponents start with very low costs of information acquisition, where investment
in expertise spikes and costs drop.
The at region where the nal cost reaches one of the lower bounds dened in Lemma 2 does
not allow for a symmetric equilibrium in expertise when 
 < 9. Instead, when initial costs are not
very low nor very high, the equilibrium in expertise has the nal costs of both agents reaching the
level where Lemma 2 meets Lemma 6. In all cases, there are symmetric equilibria at such level
of costs. Thus, equilibrium investment in expertise is pushing the agents to the boundaries of the
areas in Figures 1 and 2, and outcomes will be sensitive to slight increases in volatility. In all cases,
there is also an arms race in expertise for very low levels of initial costs. Finally, Lemma 1 prevails
when initial costs are suciently high, and there is no point in investing in expertise. All the upper
portion of the surface are equilibrium outcomes, since no investment in expertise occurs.
Our model predicts that, in some circumstances, nancial intermediaries might nd optimal
to acquire expertise even though it makes trade fragile when the volatility in fundamental value
increases. Investing in expertise makes it easier for an intermediary to subsequently acquire infor-
mation about an asset's value and it amplies the possibility of an adverse selection problem.
8We are able to characterize the conditions under which this second symmetric equilibrium will exist. A full
analysis in a supplementary appendix is available from the authors upon request or from the authors' web sites.
286 Conclusion and Extensions
The model in this paper illustrates the incentives for nancial market participants to overinvest
in nancial expertise. Expertise in nance increases the speed and eciency with which traders
and intermediaries can determine the value of assets when they are negotiating with potential
counterparties. The lower costs give them advantages in negotiation, even when the information
acquisition has no value to society, and even when it can create adverse selection that disrupts trade
if uncertainty about the volatility of fundamental values increases too quickly or unexpectedly to
allow intermediaries to adjust or scale back their investment in expertise. When volatility jumps,
the increased likelihood of facing an informed counterparty may force an intermediary to acquire
information before actually proposing a trade. Anticipation of this cost can make the whole idea of
a trade unattractive to that intermediary. If the probability of the high-volatility regime is small
enough, the gains to trade lost in the high-volatility regime will not be as important as the increase
in prots that added expertise, and the ensuing improved bargaining position, bring in the low-
volatility regime. The intermediary will nd optimal to acquire expertise that increases expected
prots in the more probable low-volatility regime, even though it decreases prots because of trade
breakdowns in the less probable high-volatility regime.
Some extensions to the model may warrant additional research. Financial expertise might
also allow intermediaries to increase the costs of information acquisition for their counterparties,
as well as lowering their own costs. Investment in expertise permits rms to create, and make
markets in, more complex nancial instruments. In our notation, we can view the cost of acquiring
information for agent i as c(ei;ej), which decreases in i's own expertise and increases in that of his
counterparty. The logic of our analysis suggests rms benet from increasing the relative costs of
their counterparties. The tension between the incentives to raise others' costs, which would reduce
adverse selection, and lower one's own costs, which increases it, may help us better understand
innovation and evolution in nancial markets.
In our model, intermediaries invest in expertise only once, and the volatility states are drawn
independently through time. This illustrates the consequences shocks to volatility have for liquidity.
If volatility is persistent through time, and intermediaries can adjust, with some cost, their level of
29expertise in response to changing volatility, then shocks to volatility will still lead to breakdowns
in liquidity, but they will also trigger contractions in \expertise" which can be interpreted as
employment of nancial professionals. Such a model might be informative about the nature of
employment cycles in nancial services.
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32Appendix A Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst show that if cs > 1
4(vh   vl), then the best response of the seller
at p
1 or p
3 is to accept the oered price without investigating. (At p
2 the seller is by denition
indierent between accepting without investigating and investigating and accepting if v = vl.)
At an oered price of p
1 the seller's surplus from accepting unconditionally is
p











This is positive as long as cs > 1
4(vh   vl). The seller's expected surplus from investigating is, by
construction, zero at p
1, so accepting unconditionally is a best response.
At an oered price of p
3 the seller's surplus from accepting unconditionally is zero by construc-



















(vh   vl)   cs:
This is negative as long as cs > 1
4(vh   vl), so accepting unconditionally is a best response.
We know that at p
2, the seller is indierent between investigating and accepting unconditionally.
However, the seller's surplus at this price is negative if cs > 1
4(vh vl). By accepting unconditionally,
the seller gets:
p










(vh   vl)   2cs
< 0:
Therefore, if oered p
2, the seller would decline and earn zero, yielding a zero payo for the buyer as
well. Thus, we need only compare the buyer's payo at p
1 and p
3, where the seller's best response
is unconditional acceptance.
At p
3, since the seller receives his reservation price, the buyer collects the gains to trade of 2.
At p
1 the buyer receives:











(vh   vl)   2cs + 2
33which is less than 2 if cs > 1
4(vh   vl).
Proof of Lemma 2: The same steps that showed unconditional acceptance to be a best response
of the seller to oers of p
1 and p
3 when cs > 1
4(vh   vl) imply investigating and accepting the
oer only when v = vl is a best response when cs  1
4(vh   vl), which is the case under both (a.)
and (b.). Similarly, we showed that the seller's surplus was negative when oered p
2, which makes
him indierent to acquiring information, as long as cs > 1
4(vh   vl). It will be positive when this
inequality is reversed.
At p
2, the seller is indierent between investigating and unconditional acceptance, but the buyer
prefers the latter. To see this, compare the buyer's surplus when the seller is informed
1
2




(vh   vl) +  + cs (1)
to that when the seller accepts unconditionally,




(vh   vl) + 2 + 2cs: (2)
The latter is obviously larger by  + cs > 0. We also know this expected surplus for the buyer
is positive, since cs > 1
4(vh   vl)    under condition (a.). Under the condition in (b.), note that
 > 1




(vh   vl) + 2 + 2cs   
1
2
(vh   vl) + 2 + 2(
1
6





















where the rst inequality follows by substituting the lower bound on cs from condition (b.).
We now need to evaluate the buyer's expected payo at p
1 and p
3. At p
1, given the seller's best
response, the buyer gets
1
2
(vl +    p
1) =    cs; (4)
which is negative since  < cs under condition (a.), but may be positive under (b.). Under condition
(b.), the buyer's surplus at p










(vh   vl) +
1
3
 + cs > 0;
34which follows from the lower bound on cs in (b.) We can therefore eliminate p
1 as a candidate
equilibrium price.
At p
3, where the seller's best response is investigation:
1
2




(vh   vl) + : (5)
The right-hand side is negative under (a.), since  < cs  1
4(vh  vl), but it may be positive under
(b.). The buyer's surplus at p





(vh   vl) + 2 + 2cs >  
1
4





(vh   vl) +  + 2cs > 0:




(vh   vl) +  + 2cs   
1
4
(vh   vl) +  +
1
3













3 as a candidate equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3: We have already established that with cs < 1
4(vh   vl), which is true here,
the seller's best response at p
1 and p





(vl +    p
1) =    cs;
which is positive since cs < .
At p
3 the buyer's surplus is
1
2
(vl +    p




Since cs < 1
4(vh   vl), the buyer prefers p
1, eliminating p
3 as a candidate for an equilibrium.
At p
2, we know the seller is indierent between investigating and accepting unconditionally,
but that the buyer prefers unconditional acceptance, from the comparison of equations (1) and (2).
The buyer's surplus from oering p
2 is given by equation 2 and exceeds the payo to oering p
1,








35Note also that this surplus must be positive and therefore preferred to no trade, since it exceeds
   cs, which in turn exceeds 0 by the assumption that cs < .
Proof of Lemma 4: From the analysis associated with equations (4) and (5) we know that if
cs > , the best payo that the buyer can achieve when inducing the seller to investigate is less than
zero. But, from (2), we can also see that the buyer can achieve a positive prot when preventing




(vh   vl)   :
But, the bounds on cs imply that  < 1
4(vh   vl)   , which in turn implies the existence of a
region where trade is not protable either with or without the seller gathering information.
Proof of Lemma 5: The arguments in the text immediately preceding the statement of the lemma
prove the result.
Proof of Lemmas 6 and 7: We prove these two lemmas together. We rst posit a two-price
equilibrium in which the buyer oers one price, pl, if the value is low and mixes between pl and
another price, ph, if the value is high. We will then derive the payo from the optimal equilibrium in
the case of Lemma 6 and the supremum of the payos in the case of Lemma 7, from the perspective
of the buyer under this assumption. We will then demonstrate that the buyer will not do better in
any equilibrium that uses more than two prices.
Assuming that there are two prices, it is immediate that the higher price must never be oered
by the buyer after observing the low value. If it were, this would imply that both prices are oered
with positive probability for both types, which would imply that the buyer is indierent between
the two prices for both realizations of the value, which is impossible.9 We can also conclude that in
any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the high price must be vh , since any lower price would admit
a protable deviation to a higher price when v = vh. Finally, we can rule out any pure strategy
equilibria; the buyer must mix between the high and the low price when the value is high, and
the seller must reject the low price with positive probability.10 The seller will reject the low price
under two circumstances. Either he does not investigate and rejects the low price anyway, or he
9For the buyer to be indierent between the two prices following both realizations of the value, we require that the
probability of trade, conditional on the price, times the expected payo to the buyer conditional on trade occuring,
be equal. This implies the ratio of expected payos, given trade, in each state be equal to the ratio of the probability
of trade, so that:
vh +    pl
vh +    ph
=
vl +    pl
vl +    ph
;
which is clearly false for ph 6= pl.
10If the seller always accepts the low price, the buyer will always oer the low price and the seller will have negative
expected prots. If the seller never accepts the low price, the buyer will never have an incentive to oer the low price
when the true value is high (since he can obtain 2 by oering a price of vh   ), and the seller then must put
probability one on the value being low following a low oer and therefore must accept with probability 1.
36investigates and rejects the low price when the true value is high. We dene the mixed strategies
as follows. Let the probability that the buyer oers the low price when v = vh be , let the
probability that the seller does not investigate following a low oer be , and let the probability
that an uninformed seller sells at the low price be . We will also dene pl = vl    + z and
ph = vh    for convenience.
To construct the equilibrium, we consider two situations. First, if z < cs, the seller will never
investigate since his payo to investigating is negative regardless of his beliefs.11 Since the seller
must reject the low price with positive probability, the seller must mix between unconditional







(vl   vh + z) = 0
where the left hand side is the payo to the strategy of accepting either pl or ph and the right hand
side is the payo for only accepting ph. This gives:
 =
z
vh   vl   z
2 (0;
cs





The subset restriction comes from the assumption that cs < 1
4(vh   vl) and guarantees that we do
not need to check whether the conditions for the seller to mix exist.
In order for the buyer to mix, we must have:




vh   vl + 2   z
which will also fall in the interval (0;1) for all parameters under consideration, i.e., for pl < ph.
11In step 3c of Dang (2008), the claim is that the seller never chooses to acquire information if (in our notiation)
z < 2cs. This is based on an incorrect calculation of the expected payo to the seller for using a strategy of
investigating following an oer of pl. The calculation fails to take into account that the seller will not pay the costs
of investigating when v is high and the buyer oers ph, an event that occurs with probability
1
2(1   ). Specically,











37The payo to the buyer in an equilibrium with a given z can be written as:
1
2
(1   )2 +
1
2
[vh +    (vl    + z)] +
1
2
[vl +    (vl    + z)] +
1
2










(2   z)   cb





   cb +
(2   z)
vh   vl + 2   z
;
which is maximized at z = 0. But, z = 0 )  = 0, which is not an equilibrium. We can thus
conclude that there does not exist an optimal equilibrium from the perspective of the buyer with
z < cs, and we can also conclude that the sup of the payos to equilibria with z < cs is
   cb +
22
vh   vl + 2
(7)
and that the buyer always prefers a smaller z and consequently must choose  very small. The
limiting value for  is also immediate, but note that it does not go to zero as z disappears. We
have now described all of the characteristics of the equilibria described in Lemma 7.
Alternatively, the buyer could oer a price that could induce the seller to investigate with
positive probability. This price must have z  cs, but while the oer price is higher, and therefore
worse for the buyer, the equilibrium may be preferable because if the seller investigates with positive
probability trade may occur more frequently when v = vl. In this situation, we require that
 =
2
vh   vl + 2   z
where  is the probability that the seller does not investigate following an oer of pl and the seller
buys anyway. The payo to the buyer is then:
   cb +
(2   z)




(2   z)(1   ):
The nal term is the contribution to the payo of the event that v = vl and the seller investigates,
necessarily buying after discovering v.12 It is straightforward to verify that this expression is strictly
decreasing in both  and z. However, we face several additional constraints in order for z and  to
12This term is one of the elements missing from the analysis in Dang (2008) (Step 3d. of the appendix). As
a consequence of including it,  and  are not separately identied by the conditions ensuring indierence in a
mixed-strategy equilibrium.
38constitute a mixed strategy equilibrium. First, we know that:
 =
2
vh   vl + 2   z
:
Since  does not enter the equilibrium payo separately from , it is immediate that at the
equilibrium that provides the highest payo to the buyer we will have  = 1. This condition will
allow  to be set as small as possible, but we still must have   2
vh vl+2 z when   1. Note
that this constraint depends on the value of z, but decreasing z relaxes the constraint (i.e. allows
a smaller  to be chosen). Thus, the payo to the buyer will be maximized by setting z as low as
possible given the other constraints. The constraints of concern are the following:
1
2
(z   cs) +
1
2
( cs)  0 (8)
1
2









(vl   vh + z): (9)
These constraints guarantee that the seller at least weakly prefers to use a strategy calling for
investigation after an oer of pl over a strategy calling for rejecting pl and over a strategy calling for
accepting pl without investigation, respectively. In any equilibrium, at least one of these constraints
must bind in order for the seller to mix as required. In the equilibrium we wish to construct, with
 2 (0;1), the second inequality must bind. The rst inequality may not bind as we have shown that
 = 1 and therefore the seller may strictly prefer investigating to not investigating and refusing to
sell at pl, but it will turn out that in the buyer's preferred equilibrium both inequalities will bind.





Inequality (9) reduces to
(vh   vl   cs   z)  cs:
Now suppose that vl   vh + z >  cs. The payo to being lied to when not investigating and
the true value is high is not as negative as the cost of investigating, so investigation is dominated
and could not be an equilibrium when vh   vl   cs   z is negative. Consequently, we have that
vh   vl   cs   z > 0 and inequality (9) becomes:
 
cs









39In order for an equilibrium to call for mixing on the part of the seller, we must then have that:
cs





which, noting that z > cs, becomes:
z2   (vh   vl)(z   cs)  0:
Therefore, to maximize the payo to the buyer, we minimize z subject to the above constraint.
The constraint is clearly violated at z = cs and for very large or very negative z, and there can be
no root of the right hand side expression for z between 0 and cs. The admissible z's, if any, must

















Again, the buyer can always obtain the full surplus 2 without investigating when cs  1
4(vh  vl);
so we can conne attention to those situations where cs is smaller.
To recap, if cs < 1
4(vh   vl), z is the smallest value for z such that the seller could, for some
range of , weakly prefer investigating following pl to both buying outright and refusing to buy at
all. Choosing this z and letting:
 =
cs
vh   vl   cs   z;
we have the equilibrium preferred by the buyer, assuming he gathers information. Note that  > 0
since cs + z < vh   vl.
But, we can now solve for:
 =
2cs




vh   vl   4cs   2cs
:
It is immediate to verify that, for cs < 1
4(vh   vl),  2 (0;1). We can also obtain
 =
4




vh   vl   4cs + 4
:
The payo to the buyer is then:




since the seller always either buys outright or investigates.
40We can ignore equilibria in which the seller mixes between investigating and rejecting without
investigation. These equilibria provide payos of:




with z > z and  < 1, so they are clearly dominated from the perspective of the buyer by the
equilibrium with mixing between investigation and outright purchase. A three-way mix can occur
only at z = z and is clearly worse than the equilibrium with mixing only between acceptance and
investigation.
So, the maximum payo to the buyer is given by:








vh   vl   4cs

: (10)
Note nally that for cs 2 (0; 1
4(vh   vl)), this expression decreases from 2   cb to 2   cb  
1
4(vh   vl).
The seller receives zero surplus since he is indierent among all alternatives at z;:
Finally, we can compare the payo to the equilibrium in which the seller obtains information
with positive probability to the upper bound on the payos when the seller never obtains infor-
mation to nd the separation point between the two lemmas. As long as  < 1
2(vh   vl) (leading




(vh   vl + 2)2:
Note that the inequality is strict because the buyer cannot obtain the sup of the payos associated
with equilibria that involve no investigation by the seller.
To complete the proof, we demonstrate that no PBE can have the buyer mixing over more than
two prices.
Suppose the buyer is informed and plays a mixed strategy with K prices when v = vh. Given the
gains to trade, it would be suboptimal for the buyer to oer a price that would be accepted by the
seller with zero probability. Under the same logic as in the two-price equilibrium (see footnote 9),
the buyer cannot be indierent between a particular pair of the K prices, simultaneously when
v = vh and when v = vl. Hence, only one price among the K prices can be chosen when v = vl. Let
pl denote this price. In a PBE, any of the K   1 prices not chosen when v = vl will be interpreted
by an uninformed seller as a perfect signal that v = vh. Therefore, the seller will accept with
probability one any price that is higher than or equal to vh . The buyer prefers the lowest price
possible, and vh    will be the only price chosen when v = vh, other than pl. Hence, in a PBE,
the buyer will mix over no more than two prices when v = vh. The only remaining way to have
a PBE with more than two prices, therefore, is to have the buyer playing a mixed strategy when
41v = vl involving prices other those played when v = vh. Any prices the buyer choses when v = vl
that are not pl, an uninformed seller will interpret as a perfect signal that v = vl. As in the case
with v = vh, only one price other than pl can be chosen by the buyer with positive probability, and
accepted by the seller with positive probability, when v = vl in a PBE. That price is vl  , which
is the minimum price the seller would accept in the model. At that price, the seller will know for
sure that v = vl and will accept the oer. Since we need pl > vl    to have mixing over more
than two prices and acceptance by the seller with positive probability, the buyer will nd optimal
to deviate and always oer vl   , rather than pl, which rules out the possibility of another price
coexisting with pl in the low-value state. Hence, only two-price PBEs will exist.
Proof of Proposition 1
Part A:  = 0:
We will rst consider the case when   1
9.
The proposed equilibrium places the agents at the intersection of Lemma 2 (part a) and
Lemma 4, and, for 
 = 9, at the intersection of these two areas with that governed by Lemma 6.
Any deviation to a higher investment in expertise reduces payos to the deviator when he is the
seller from 2 to 0. While payos increase when the deviator is the buyer (from 0), 2 is an
upper bound13 on the increase. Therefore, since the additional expertise investment is costly, the
deviation cannot be protable. If c0(e)   (1   ), the payos given by Lemma 2(a), and the
convexity of the cost function imply that deviations to a lower level of expertise investment are
unprotable. Then, no e < e can be an equilibrium because there would be a protable local
deviation to a higher level of expertise as such an equilibrium would mean the agents were in the
interior of the Lemma 2(a) region.
To see that these choices are unique under the restrictions on the marginal cost, suppose an
agent chooses e > e. Then there is a protable deviation to less expertise since c0(e) >  2(1   )
for all e > e, because the payo to the seller is invariant in his own costs in the Lemma 6 region
while the payo to the seller is decreasing linearly with slope   1
1  in his own costs.
If c0(e) >  (1   ), deviating to less expertise is protable at e, and there is no protable
deviation to more expertise from ^ e. (If c0(^ e) =  (1   ) ) c(^ e) > 1
4

, there will be no investment
in expertise, while if c0(^ e) =  1 ) c(^ e) < 1
4

, but c(0) > 1
4

, the equilibrium may call for
no investment in expertise since it may not be protable to pay the xed costs associated with
increasing expertise up to c(e) = 1
4

, the point at which expertise begins to pay o at the margin.)
The nal step is to show that agents will always play according to Lemma 2(a) in the subgame.
Play with the characteristics of Lemma 4 (and, for 
 = 9, Lemma 6) can also be supported
in a subgame following investment in expertise of e. However, if play proceeds according to
either Lemma 4 or Lemma 6 with positive probability there is a protable deviation from e
13The value 2 is not the sup, but the fact that it is an upper bound is sucient for our purposes.
42since by unilaterally and innitesimally reducing investment in expertise either party can move the
agents into the interior of the Lemma 2(a) region. Since Lemma 2(a) provides ecient payos and
Lemmas 4 and 6 do not, there would always be some small reduction in expertise investment that
would be protable.
We now consider the case where 
 < 9.
The discussion relating to e < e from above applies eectively unchanged, so it remains only
to show that there is no protable increase in expertise when c0(e) <  (1   ).
To show that there is no protable increase in expertise, observe that fc(e);c(e)g denes
the symmetric cost point at which the buyer is just indierent between gathering information
and not. Any increase in expertise by one agent moves the game to either the Lemma 6 region
or the Lemma 3 region when the deviator is the seller. This yields zero payo to the seller in














. The expression in the rst set of parentheses is the payo to adhering that




 exceeds the lower bound for the sellers cost for the Lemma 2 region when the buyer
does not gather information whenever 
 < 9, as assumed. That is, the point at which Lemma 3
transitions to Lemma 2 occurs where the buyer and the seller are sharing the surplus, not where the
seller gets all of the surplus. The expression in the second set of parentheses is the payo when the
deviator is the buyer, assuming he deviates to c(e) = 0, but does not accrue any additional expenses
with respect to expertise (an upper bound on the payo to the deviation. Direct calculation then
shows that the payo to a deviation is no greater than   1
24

, so there is no protable deviation
to more expertise.
Part B:  > 0:
In this proof it is convenient to introduce a normalization on the costs. We dene ki  ci
 for
i 2 fb;sg. All descriptions of boundaries for costs will be in terms of these normalized costs, and
the ratio of volatility to gains to trade, denoted A = 
.
First, we note the following facts:
The buyer's (normalized) cost, as a function of the seller's cost, that sets the buyer's payo
equal in Lemma 2 and in Lemma 6 is increasing in A when ks 2 (0; 1
4A]. The derivative of that
boundary with respect to A is:
A +
p





and is real and positive when ks < 1
4A, or equivalently when cs < 1
4. To see this, note that




















(   4cs)   8cs

:







A(A   4ks)   8ks

:
Dierentiating this expression with respect to A gives the desired expression. Note that in taking
this derivative it is not appropriate to treat ks as a function of  and therefore of A because we
are considering where the buyer is indierent for kb;ks pairs.
The buyer's (normalized) cost, as a function of the seller's cost, that sets the buyer's payo







A(A   4ks) + 8
i
:
The derivative of that boundary with respect to A is:
A  
p





which is positive whenever ks 2 (0; 1
4A], or equivalently cs 2 (0; 1
4].
The seller's (normalized) cost that divides Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 is also increasing in A. This
is obvious from Lemma 4, noting cs  1
4    is equivalent to ks  1
4A   1.
Now suppose that both agents invest in expertise up to e(A), hence play proceeds according
to Lemma 2 in the low-volatility regime.14 For A < 9, e(A) will be on the boundary between
Lemmas 6 and 2. Thus, an increase in volatility to A will move play into the Lemma 6 region, as
is clear from the above three facts.
What happens when A  9 is somewhat less obvious. When A increases, play can no longer
remain in the Lemma 2 region because the seller's costs now imply that play proceeds according to
Lemma 4 if the buyer is informed. However, since the boundary between Lemmas 4 and 6 boundary
is increasing in A, we cannot immediately rule out the possibility that play proceeds according to
























14Note that the condition for e

















if A  9
;
which permits us to write e
 as a function of A.
44That is, the function dening the boundary between Lemmas 4 and 6 will converge to a nite
function. Since we know that, for A  9, the symmetric equilibrium is where the diagonal intersects
the vertical line at 1
4A 1, we know that play will always proceed according to Lemma 4 regardless









which means that the limit, as A goes to +1, of the threshold on cb for Lemma 4 is smaller than
the smallest cost level in Lemma 2 and reduces to the condition A > 28
3 .
The magnitude of the shock required is given by nding the shock  that moves the boundary
for the buyer's decision to acquire information, evaluated at the normalized costs associated with
e(A) (which are given by 1
4A   1 from Proposition 1), to that same cost level. That is, we
nd the threshold for the shock to lead to play according to Lemma 6 by nding the increase in
volatility that makes the buyer just indierent between acquiring and not acquiring information at





















Since the boundary is monotonically increasing in A (and therefore ), this implies that we enter
the Lemma 6 region if and only15 if  
(A 12)2
A(28 3A). Otherwise, play proceeds according to Lemma 4.
We need to show that there does not exist a unilateral deviation in expertise that would be
optimal for one agent. We rst study what would happen if one agent were to increase expertise
above e and then we study what would happen if one agent were to decrease expertise below e.
Suppose one agent were to increase his investment in expertise enough to move to the Lemma 6
region when he turns out to be the buyer. When he is the seller, the game would either remain in the
region of Lemma 4 for small increases or it would move to Lemma 6 or Lemma 3 for larger increases.
All of these regions would give him zero payos. The only gain to an increase in expertise would
have to accrue when he is the buyer. But using Lemma 6 we can show that, keeping the seller's
cost xed and below 1
2, the payo to the buyer at any level of his own costs will be decreasing in
A. Therefore, the buyer's payo will be strictly lower in the high-volatility regime than in the low-
volatility regime. So the benets from increasing expertise in the stochastic-volatility setting will be
smaller than the benets from increasing expertise in the constant-volatility setting (where the low-
volatility regime always occurs). Therefore, since increasing expertise above e is not a protable
unilateral deviation in the constant-volatility setting, such deviation will not be protable when
15Since we assume the choice preferred by the buyer is made if the seller is indierent.
45volatility is stochastic either.
If A  28
3 or 9 < A < 28
3 and  <
(A 12)2
A(28 3A), an agent could consider reducing his investment
in expertise such that play is on the boundary between Lemma 4 and 2 and trade occurs with
probability one in the high-volatility regime when he is the seller. This deviation clearly dominates
all the other possible deviations where expertise is lower than e. Such deviation would be costly
in the low-volatility regime because the deviator's payos would be reduced at a rate of 2
1  as his
cost increases, until he reaches the region of Lemma 1 where his payo is zero. On the other hand,
his payo would increase to 2 in the high-volatility regime. A deviation to such a lower level of
expertise (or anything lower) would not be protable when  is low enough. To see this, let ~ e()
be the level of expertise such that the seller gets a payo of 2 in the high volatility state.
Then, the dierence in payos from picking e rather than ~ e(), when the probability of the






[c(~ e())   c(e)]   [e   ~ e()] (11)
If  = 0, then we get from property P2 that the expression in (11) is positive and e is the
optimal level of expertise.







[c(~ e())   c(e)];
which is bounded from below by   1
1 [ + c(0)], which is nite. Thus, by continuity, for  close
enough to zero, the expression in (11) is positive and e provides the seller with a higher expected
payo ex ante than any other level of expertise.
If A  9 or 9 < A < 28
3 and  
(A 12)2
A(28 3A), the analogous reduction in expertise would lead play
to the boundary between Lemmas 2 and 6 (or sometimes Lemma 7) in the high-volatility regime.
In this case, the above discussion applies with the adjustment that 11 represents a lower bound on
the excess value of choosing e over a lower level of expertise since payos to the seller will be less
than 2 at ~ e() in the high volatility state and payos to the buyer at e are not zero in the high
volatility state (since play proceeds according to Lemma 6 rather than Lemma 4), and in fact are
higher at e than at ~ e() < e since the buyer's payo in the subgame must be (weakly) decreasing
in his own costs regardless of the costs of the seller.
Appendix B Deriving the buyer's information acquisition bound-
ary
Here, we the denote the ratio of volatility to gains to trade as A = 
, and normalize  = 1 without
loss of generality.
46To determine whether the buyer will acquire information for a particular cost pair fcs;cbg at
a particular A, we simply nd the cost to the buyer that makes him indierent between acquiring
information and not acquiring information, exploiting the fact that his information acquisition
decision induces a proper subgame. Thus, we can simply compare the payos to the buyer for a
given A and cs under the appropriate lemma when the buyer does and does not acquire information.
These thresholds are all derived in the lemmas in the text and produce the following boundary
segments:
For Lemma 3 versus 6, the buyer acquires information if his costs satisfy:















A(A   4cs) + 4cs + 4

:
















A(A   4cs) + 8

:
For Lemma 2 versus 6, the buyer acquires information if his costs satisfy:


















A(A   4cs) + 8cs

:
For Lemma 2 versus 7, the buyer acquires information if his costs satisfy:
2cs + 2  
A
2




A2   4Acs   8cs
2(A + 2)
:
These four cases exhaust all possible relevant comparisons. If the game proceeds according to
Lemma 1 when the buyer does not acquire information, he will clearly not acquire information if
his costs are even weakly positive since he can capture the full surplus while remaining uninformed.
Comparisons between Lemma 7 and any lemma other than Lemma 2 are irrelevant since cs >
2A2
(A+2)2 > 0 (the threshold for Lemma 7 to be relevant) implies cs > maxf1
4A   1; 1
6A   1
3g (the
threshold above which Lemma 2 becomes relevant when the buyer does not acquire information).
From the above 4 conditions, we can determine whether the buyer acquires information for any
pair fcs;Ag. Of course for some values of A certain of the above conditions will be irrelevant for
all values of cs, as is obvious from Figure 1.







6(vh − vl) − 1
3∆ 1




















4(vh − vl) − ∆ 1




























Figure 1: Regions of seller's costs where Lemmas 1-4 apply. The ve cases depend on the relative


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Response Surfaces when Volatility is Stochastic. Panel (a) shows the best responses in the
level of expertise given the initial cost of investigation and the cost level of potential counterparties.
Panel (b) shows the costs that result from optimal investment in expertise, given the same variables.
The highlighted line identies the cost pairs (agent's initial cost vs. opponent's nal cost) that lead
to symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nancial expertise. Figures are generated by setting:
 = 0:9,  = 1,  = 1,  = 1:1,  = 0:05, and  = 10.
50Figure 4: Symmetric Equilibria when Volatility is Constant. The highlighted line identies the
cost pairs (agent's initial cost vs. opponent's nal cost) that lead to symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in nancial expertise. Figure is generated by setting:  = 0:9,  = 1,  = 1,  = 1:1,
 = 0:05, and  = 10.
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